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Abstract
This paper utilizes fantasy football snake drafts to analyze risk tolerance of
individuals who are trying to maximize their present and future utility, but are faced with
unknown factors and only have limited resources. Fantasy football provides a unique
perspective on risk tolerance, different than the commonly researched fields of auctions,
financial portfolios, and lotteries. I examine mock draft data from Fantasy Football
Calculator as well as rankings data from Fantasy Pros to gauge the amount of risk
associated with each draft pick. I find that the more perceived uncertainty that is
connected to an individual selection, the more likely the selection will exhibit risk averse
characteristics.

i

Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank my parents, David and Diana, as well as the rest
of my family. For without their constant and unwavering guidance, support, and love I
would not be where I am today.

I would also like to thank Professor Antecol for her invaluable advice and comments
throughout this entire process. Also, I would like all of my Professors I have had the
privilege of learning from. You have all not only taught me something about economics
or mathematics, but also about life.

Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank all of my friends. From the ones I met
on the bus ride to Sacramento the first day of college to the ones I just met last week in
Poppa. I can’t express how much I meant to come back from working for 12 straight
hours, to see you all in The Pod talking and laughing about whatever ridiculous thing
happened that day. These past four years were able to be the best of my life because of
the friendships that were created and I truly believe each and every one of you will be a
friend for life.

ii

Table of Contents
I. Introduction …………………………………………………………………………... 1
II. Background of Fantasy Football ……………………………………………………... 4
III. Literature Review ………………………………………………………………….... 7
IV. Data ………………………………………………………………………………… 12
V. Empirical Strategy and Results ……………………………………………………... 18
VI. Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………. 28
Appendix ……………………………………………………………………………….. 30
References ……………………………………………………………………………… 39

iii

1. Introduction
Despite the various questionnaires and scientific approaches that exist today, risk
tolerance is a difficult concept to quantify. There are numerous factors that contribute to
an individual’s risk tolerance, which ultimately culminate in decisions that align with the
amount of risk each person deems acceptable. Most of the research regarding risk
tolerance focuses on financial investing (see for example, Treich 1997 and Wong 2016),
auctions (see for example, Beggs 1997 and Mezzetti 2011), and lotteries (see for
example, Garrett 1999).
The financial risk tolerance analysis is centered around the elements that
determine the appropriate amount of risk investors are willing to take in their own
portfolio (Treich 1997 and Wong 2016) whereas the risk tolerance concerning auctions
and lotteries are more focused on payoff uncertainty and the availability of resources
(Beggs 1997). Moreover, the analysis of what factors contribute to financial portfolio
risk and lotteries typically uses volatility or uncertainty of returns as a proxy for risk (see
for example, Wong 2016, Grable 2000, and Garrett 1999). On the other hand, studies on
auctions often focus on the price a good is acquired (see for example, Mezzetti 2011 and
Beggs 1997), where the bidding process typically involves all owners.
However, there are other aspects of risk tolerance that receive less attention but
are important to understand when examining consumer preferences. For instance, the
only existing literature regarding risk tolerance with similar goods is focused on auctions
(McAfee 1993). But there are other contexts where risk tolerance can be examined
besides the heavily structured auction setting. There is a significant aspect of consumer
decision making that occurs repeatedly when individuals are presented with choosing
1

between purchasing a good in the present or waiting for the price of the good to decrease.
Although waiting comes with the risk of the good being purchased by another party. If
this were to take place the individual would be forced to purchase a less preferred good.
These circumstances are common with hotel rooms and airplane flights, but can occur
with any finite good that has a number of inferior replacements. Obtaining more
knowledge regarding consumer risk tolerance of these goods can have a substantial
impact on the way they are priced and marketed.
The main aspect of risk tolerance that has the most impact is loss aversion
(Guillemette 2014). Typically risk tolerance is measured through the imperfect
mechanism of surveys and studies like the FinaMetrica questionnaire and various others
designed by financial services firms. While collecting and judging risk tolerance through
direct observation is preferred, there are inherent challenges with that methodology as
well. For instance, there is no perfect measure for risk tolerance and so often times it is
interpreted from a proxy metric. There are studies examining if a study participant prefers
a more certain payoff with a lower expected value versus a payoff with a higher expected
value, but the potential to receive zero benefit (see Bhattacharya 2008). However, there is
little research done regarding how an individual’s risk tolerance is affected when there
are unknown factors, numerous options, and the individual has limited resources.
The purpose of this paper is to add to the existing literature by analyzing risk
tolerance for individuals who are trying to maximize their present and future utility, but
have limited resources and are presented with unknown factors that reduce future choice.
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Specifically, this paper focuses on fantasy football snake drafts 1, which offer a unique
lens through which one can observe risk tolerance. 2
First, this is the case because in snake drafts, the maximum players the owner of a
fantasy team can select is equal to the number of available roster spots. Also, the
frequency at which an owner can make selections is also predetermined and known by all
parties. In conjunction with limited resources, there is the additional element of
uncertainty that manifests itself through the other owners systematically reducing the
number of remaining players in the process of forming their own teams. Contrary to the
traditional methods of analysis for financial portfolio or lottery risk tolerance, I am not
looking at the risk of the asset, but the divergence from consensus industry rankings. In
addition, snake drafts are different than auctions, as snake drafts consist of each owner
selecting players one at a time, with no explicit bidding involved.
Using data from Fantasy Football Calculator and Fantasy Pros I create a binary
proxy measure for risk based on the methodology proposed in Ozbeklik and Smith
(2014). Using the idea laid out in their research, I leverage the difference between
expected outcomes and observed outcomes to quantify risk. I find that selections exhibit
lower risk tolerance when there is a large degree of uncertainty resulting from either a
large distance between selections by the same owner or a small number of humans
present in the draft. In addition, when owners choose to select a player who plays the
same position as multiple prior selected players, he or she tends to display more risk
1

A snake draft is when each participant takes turns selecting a good in the first round and in all subsequent
rounds, the order reverses. So the individual with the first selection in odd rounds has the last selection in
even rounds and so on. See Section II: Background of Fantasy Football for a more in depth explanation.
2
While there are some studies investigating fantasy football auction drafts (see for example,
Anagnostopoulos 2016 and Cockcroft 2017), they mostly deal with optimal auction strategies, not risk.
Further, to the best of my knowledge there is no literature specifically looking at the risk connected with
snake drafts.
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averse behavior. This could potentially be due to owners fear of missing out on a specific
player. When owners perceive the chance of the particular player as high, he or she may
select that player before another owner has the opportunity to do so.
I begin in the next section by providing background on fantasy football and the
elements of snake drafts and mock drafts. Then I discuss the existing literature regarding
risk tolerance in Section III. Section IV describes the data used and provides relevant
summary statistics. Section V expands on my empirical strategy and examines the results
from different economic models. Finally, Section VI presents concluding thoughts and
provides potential avenues for future research.

2. Background of Fantasy Football
Fantasy football drafts create a unique and informative set of conditions that are
ideal for investigating risk tolerance and preference strength. Fantasy football is a
competitive game played between individuals that utilize real life performance of the
National Football League (NFL) players to award fantasy points to those same players.
Typically fantasy football is played by a number of owners who together make up a
“league”. The most common size of a league is 10-12 owners, however a league can be
any size.
The objective of fantasy football is to assemble a team comprised of NFL players
that scores the most points in a given week. The specifics of scoring depend on each
leagues’ settings, but the majority of leagues award points to offensive positions
(quarterback, running back, wide receiver, and tight end) for yards, touchdowns, and
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receptions, to defenses/special teams for fewer points conceded, interceptions, fumbles
recovered, and touchdowns scored, and to kickers for made field goals and extra points.
Often times prior to an owner’s draft, he or she will participate in a mock draft.
Mock drafts serve as a practice setting for fantasy football owners to test their various
draft strategies in a low risk environment before participating in their official draft where
money or pride may be on the line. The purpose of a mock draft is to acquire information
for official drafts through the experimentation of various strategies as well as understand
how other owners value certain players. Owners are attempting to identify the previously
unknown market value for players in order to infer the expected team structure associated
with a particular set of draft picks, of which they might be completely unfamiliar. So, the
incentive structure of mock drafts must also be considered when analyzing the underlying
causes of an owner’s tolerance for risk. As a result, mock drafts provide valuable
information on how owners view risk and potential uncertainty in numerous particular
strategies.
Due to a variety of reasons, the more volatile positions in fantasy football tend to
be kicker and defense, followed by running back, then wide receiver and tight end, with
quarterbacks typically retaining their value for most of the year. The reason kickers tend
to be the most volatile is that NFL teams in the majority of cases only carry one kicker on
the roster. In addition, if the kicker underperforms for even a short amount of time, often
times he will be cut from the NFL team. Players who are not recording statistics for their
NFL team cannot score fantasy points and thus, fantasy football owners tend to drop
kickers from their roster if they are cut from their NFL team. Likewise, defense and
special teams units also tend to be volatile, but for different reasons. Since defenses and
5

special teams units consist of over 11 different players, often times in between seasons
players leave certain teams and join others. This results in a change in effectiveness of the
defensive and special teams’ unit that may be challenging to predict before the season
starts. Injuries also play a large role, as there exists the potential for multiple key
defensive players to get hurt, reshaping the defensive unit as a whole. Even though
running back and wide receiver are not as inherently risky as kicker and defensive units,
both positions come with a level of unpredictability. A reason for this is the increased
injury risk associated with running backs and wide receivers in contrast with the much
lower injury risk linked with quarterbacks.
One factor contributing to positional value in fantasy football is roster
construction, both in fantasy football and real world football. The standard fantasy roster
only requires owners start one quarterback and one tight end, but two wide receivers and
two running backs, along with a flex that is typically either a third running back or wide
receiver. Compounding this built in risk is the fact that most NFL teams carry more wide
receivers on their roster than running backs and teams prefer to primarily rely on one
running back, but multiple receivers.
As previously stated, all of these factors allow for investigating risk through an
atypical, yet informative lens. Certain information is known to all parties involved, such
as the exact set of picks each owner possesses well as the number of roster spots on each
team. Conversely, owners do not know the private valuations of other owners in the draft.
So as owners continue to select players, they are reducing the available resources for
other individuals in the draft. Also, snake drafts allow risk tolerance to be measured
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through disparity of expected outcome and observed outcome. Whereas the other three
avenues of analysis, financial risk tolerance, auctions, and lotteries traditionally measure
risk in different ways.
3. Literature Review
As mentioned briefly earlier, the existing literature concerning fantasy football is
mostly focused on optimal auction draft strategies and roster construction. Cockcroft
(2017) investigates the state of the NFL each year and the best approach to take when
approaching an auction draft. However, his annual work does not examine determinants
of risk tolerance with regards to snake drafts.
Chakravarthy (2012) specifically examines risk, but in an attempt to discover an
optimal auction draft strategy. He finds risk neutral betting during the auction is the
strategy that maximizes the owner’s utility and that risk averse behavior is only an
optimal strategy under certain conditions. That condition being when there are a large
number of owners in the draft who exhibit risk neutral or risk loving behavior, it is more
optimal to adopt a risk neutral bidding strategy. Anagnostopoulos et al. (2016) look at
how to create a strategy in an auction draft that mitigates any potential downside. Similar
to Cockcroft’s analysis, Chakravarthy and Anagnostopoulos et al. (2016) focus solely on
auctions and do not dive into the underlying elements that determine an owners risk
profile.
To augment the limited literature regarding fantasy football, three other fields of
economic analysis and their findings regarding risk tolerance are discussed. Specifically
the existing literature centered around financial investing, auctions, and lotteries that

7

looks at risk tolerance, its root causes, and its effect on the price of goods. I discuss each
in turn.
Looking at the literature discussing financial investing, there are a number of
studies investigating the value of information with respect to risk tolerance. Based on
casual observation and intuition, individuals with a lower risk tolerance would place a
high premium on information. This way they can ensure their risk is minimized. But
Treich (1997) and Eeckhoudt (2000) show there exists the potential for risk averse
individuals to in fact place a lower value on information than their more risk neutral
counterparts since risk averse individuals prefer less risky assets in any case. As such, the
amount of information may or may not have a material impact on the decision making
process, depending on the inherent risk tolerance of the individual.
Wong (2016) looks at the relationship between financial risk tolerance and
ambiguity tolerance, which is defined as the ability to accept uncertainty despite the
discomfort of not knowing the answer. He finds, despite traditional reasoning, there is no
relationship between the two. Even considering that both factors have something to do
with unpredictability, there is the possibility that risk uncertainty is viewed differently
than ambiguity uncertainty. Relating this to risk in fantasy football, there are certain
positions that are intrinsically riskier than others, but this risk is known. Whereas, the risk
associated with uncertainty could manifest itself through the distance between selections
by the same owner. The greater the distance between picks, the larger the uncertainty.
Moving onto auctions, one can see some similarities between a snake draft and a
first-price, or Dutch auction. A first price auction is where the person with the highest bid
wins the item and pays his or her bid. In practice, first price auctions often involve the
8

auctioneer starting with a high price and reducing it until one person chooses to pay the
most recently stated price for the item. Snake drafts share certain characteristics with a
Dutch auction, namely with regards to when a player is selected, the owner is technically
paying the highest price any of the other owners is willing to pay.
Schotter (1988) shows that the perfect equilibrium bids in an auction are a good
predictor of prices, which would indicate that all draft selections follow the rankings
relatively well with little deviation. But this assumes rankings can be ordinal, whereas
fantasy football rankings, or equilibrium values, are cardinal. Thus private valuations are
forced to be dependent on other available assets. An additional element is that only when
the perfect equilibrium bids are below each players’ valuation does the perfect
equilibrium serve as a good estimate for prices. This is not inherently the case in all
scenarios, as an owner could have a private value of a player could be higher than the
perfect equilibrium bid.
McAfee (1993) confirms the idea of the winner of the item not having the highest
valuation for that specific item in sequential auctions because the auction consists of both
the items to be sold as well as an additional risk element. This is what is known as a
declining price anomaly in auctions. van den Berg et al. (2001) further explores this
effect, specifically with regards to Dutch auctions. They conclude the phenomenon not
only exists, but also increases in magnitude as the number of remaining units decreases.
Auctions that are ordered by descending estimated values, tend to see the price
relative to the pre-auction estimate decreases (Beggs 1997). This requires the assumption
that snake drafts are ordered by descending value. Since by construction, players are
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selected in declining order of valuation, the assumption seems reasonable. Given this, as
the draft continues, the draft position relative to the pre-draft ranking will begin to vary.
Mezzetti (2011) shows when approximate market values are known for the items
in the auction, thus decreasing value interdependencies, the prices are expected to
decrease as the rounds progress. This supports the idea that, while information may have
differing value depending on the risk tolerance of the owner, it still has positive value.
Rodriguez (2009) identifies an equilibrium when dealing with sequential auctions with
any number of periods and bidders, but the equilibrium relies on the assumption of
complete information.
Another economic area of analysis which relates to fantasy football snake drafts is
lotteries, as the players selected are not accompanied by guaranteed performance, but
inherent risk. Risk arising from injuries, under performance, or over performance by the
given player or other members on the same team, which deprives said player of chances
to succeed. Certain players are viewed as “safer” and are considered to have a smaller
band of likely outcomes, whereas some players are viewed as “riskier” and have a wider
band of likely outcomes.
Casual observation suggests that as the draft progresses, owners are more likely to
diverge from draft rankings because the expected performance of the player selected
generally declines as the draft occurs. As the draft progresses, the increased variance in
performance makes the draft go from appearing like an auction with similarly priced
items to a lottery. As such, at the late stages in the draft, owners are attempting to select
players whose performance has a high variance and could result in a much higher level of
performance than expected. Bhattacharya (2008) confirms the idea that gamblers are
10

willing to trade expected value for an increase in variance, even when the expected value
is originally negative. Garrett (1999) shows that this phenomenon is not simply lottery
participants who are risk loving, but in fact it applies also to the risk averse players. Thus,
as the expected value of the player decreases, the more likely an owner will be willing to
select that player if his performance is viewed as having a higher variance.
Smith and Ozbeklik (2016) examine risk taking in a tournament setting by
analyzing rounds of golf. They create a metric based off deviation from the norm to
evaluate the amount of risk taken. The further away from the norm, the more risk a golfer
took. In order to identify what is the norm, they use the par score for each hole. If an
individual golfer does better or worse than the par score, that is a sign he took a risk when
playing the hole. If the golfer scored well, the risk paid off and if he scored poorly, the
risk did not pay off. However, this study is not perfect. While the tournaments are
between a large number of contestants, only two golfers competed against each other at
one time. So this analysis does not provide the opportunity to examine if the number of
contestants participating had an effect on the level of risk taken.
This paper builds upon the current knowledge base by testing the findings that
previous studies demonstrate under a different set of circumstances. For instance,
Schotter’s (1988) findings of perfect equilibrium bids accurately predicting prices is
restricted to auctions where the rankings are cardinal. As fantasy football rankings are
ordinal, it is impossible for every selection to be classified as below the valuation. This
inevitably leads to owners selecting players prior to when the market believes they should
be picked.
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McAfee (1993) and other auction studies use similar items in order to examine the
legitimacy of the declining price effect. In snake drafts, it is certainly possible for the
owner with the highest valuation of a player to not select that player. This indicates there
is some potential for owners to select players earlier than their internal valuation would
suggest in order to ensure another owner could not select the given player. This paper
quantifies some of the reasoning behind why some owners are more risk averse and
choose to select players well before their ranking.
Previous analyses of risk tolerance focus on similar goods in order to isolate the
reduction of supply. Whereas this paper is concerned with different types of goods,
typically drafted in descending order of value, and examining other contributing factors
to risk tolerance besides a limited supply.

4. Data
The data used in this paper were acquired from two separate fantasy football
websites: fantasyfootballcalculator.com (FFC) and fantasypros.com (FP). FFC is a
website that allows users to participate in mock drafts for a variety of different league
sizes and scoring systems. In order to ensure the mock drafts are consistently taking place
without exorbitant wait times, FFC employs a system where mock drafts are held at
regular intervals regardless of how many participants are signed up to take part in a draft.
Since the draft beginning even if it is not completely filled with users, FFC has a
computer algorithm to control the unoccupied draft slots. As long as there is one human
participating in the mock draft, the draft will continue. But if all the humans drafting exit
the draft page, the draft immediately concludes. FFC is one of the only websites that
12

publishes their fantasy football draft data, as most of the popular fantasy football
platforms, such as ESPN, Yahoo, and CBS, choose to keep their individual draft data
proprietary and only release aggregated data. I focus solely on drafts that consist of eight
teams and 15 rounds, for a total of 120 selections per fully completed draft with standard
scoring rules. In order to extract the data from each of the 975 available drafts, or
117,000 draft picks, a web scraper was written and designed in Python. Data extracted
from FFC mock drafts includes the player selected with each pick, the round number, the
number of humans in the draft, the number of rounds completed, the position of the
player selected, and the overall pick number in the draft.
Player rankings were acquired from FP in order to calculate a proxy for risk
associated with each selection. FP averages the rankings for standard scoring leagues of
100 fantasy football writers in order to determine an industry consensus ranking. The
only information utilized from FP consists of the ranking for each player.
I restrict the sample of draft picks to only those that occurred in complete drafts.
That is, I exclude all picks from drafts where at some during the draft, there are no more
humans participating. This could be due to a number of reasons. Potentially humans
participating in the draft were not paying attention throughout the entire process, lost
interest midway through the draft, or an owner’s internet connection malfunctioned. As a
result, the 116 incomplete drafts and all 13,920 associated draft picks are excluded from
the analysis. I also restrict the sample to players on an NFL team which excludes an
additional 16 draft picks. 3 Furthermore, I restrict the sample to human selections since

3

Most of the excluded selections were quarterback Colin Kaepernick.
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the purpose of this paper is to ascertain human risk tolerance. As such, the 58,950 nonhuman draft picks are excluded from the analysis. 4
In order to measure the risk tolerance of individual selections, a method similar to
that of the one used by Smith and Ozbeklik (2016) is employed. They measure risk in
two different ways, percentage of holes conceded and standard deviation of player scores
relative to par. Since owners cannot concede picks in fantasy football drafts, my risk
metric focuses on the second component of their risk measure. Instead of par values for a
benchmark for risk, I use the aggregated set of rankings from FP. So the rankings serve as
the expected outcome and the owners selection serves as the measure for observed
outcome. By comparing the two and analyzing the sign and magnitude of the difference I
am able to examine the amount of risk tolerance associated with each pick. Specifically,
my main measure of risk is the comparison of a player's’ rank with the overall draft pick
that was used to select him.
A positive figure indicates the player selected should have been selected earlier in
the draft. This is a sign the owner made a good selection and was able to capitalize on
other owners selecting players before their rank. On the other hand, a large negative
figure would signify an owner selected a player before his ranking showed he should be
drafted. In other words, a large negative figure would indicate the person does not want
to take the risk of that player being selected before his or her next selection. The larger
the difference between the two numbers in the negative direction, the lower risk tolerance
a person has. Due to the construction of the measurement, the highest possible sum of

4

I discuss one exception to this sample restriction in detail below.
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pick versus rank across an entire draft is zero, which would indicate all selections in the
given draft consisted of the top 120 players in the ranking in some order.
When the pick versus rank difference is positive, this indicates the owner was able
to select a player later than the consensus rankings believes he should be selected. All
that indicates is the selection captured value due to the selections of the other participants
in the draft. This does not allow for any type of interpretation regarding the amount of
risk an owner is willing to tolerate. Therefore, all 20,664 individual draft picks where the
pick versus rank figure is positive are omitted from any analysis. There are also two draft
pick observations that have overall pick numbers greater than 120 that are treated as
outliers and dropped from the dataset. The final sample size is 23,448 individual draft
picks from numerous different owners and drafts.
The problem with solely using the gross difference is the unequal value of
selections across various rounds in the draft. For example, a value of negative five would
be treated the same way if it was applied to the first overall pick versus the last overall
pick. The distribution of negative pick versus rank values is heavily skewed towards
zero. 6 However, the median value of the pick versus rank difference is drastically larger
in the later rounds of the draft as compared to the early rounds. 7 There is a clear increase
in the magnitude of the pick versus rank values as the round increases. This indicates
owners are more likely to diverge from the ranking as the draft continues.
In order to account for this variation across rounds, I create a binary variable to
identify the lowest quartile of pick versus rank values for each round. The binary variable

6
7

See Figure 1 in the appendix.
Figure 2 shows the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of pick versus rank for each of the 15 rounds.
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takes the value of one when the selection is within the highest 75th percentile of pick
versus rank and zero otherwise. This indicator variable, henceforth referred to as risk25,
serves as a way to account for the different distributions of pick versus rank throughout
the 15 rounds. To help identify further effects of drafting a player in a late round, I create
an indicator variable for a late round which is defined by whether or not the pick occurred
in the final five rounds of the draft.
A major factor in determining how an owner chooses to construct his or her team
is by looking at the different positions and how the average team is constructed. 8 The
average team drafts almost three times as many running backs and wide receivers as
quarterbacks and five times as many as defense/special teams and kickers. As a result of
owners inherently valuing each of the positions differently, I create indicator variables for
each of the six positions that could be drafted: quarterback, running back, wide receiver,
tight end, defense/special teams, and place kicker.
A crucial element of fantasy football snake drafts is the potential for “runs”. A run
occurs when multiple sequential picks are used on players who play the same position.
Three indicator variables are created to capture the possible effect a run can have on the
risk of a selection. The first variable takes the value of one when the three previous
selections are players of the same position. In order to examine the effect of longer runs,
two additional variables are created that take the value of one when the four and five
previous selections are players who play the same position. This set of three variables
will henceforth be referred to as non-participating run variables.

8

See Appendix Table 3 for a breakdown of the average team by position for human teams.
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The second set of three variables are designed to examine the effect of an owner
participating in the run. So they are defined the same way as the non-participating run
variables except they only take the value of one if the owner who is making the current
selection also selects a player who plays the same position. In other words, these three
variables only take the value of one if the owner participates in the run on a specific
position. These three variables will be referred to in future discussion as participating run
variables.
So despite computer observations being dropped for most of the analysis, they are
included in the calculation for all of the variables which consider previous picks. All six
of these indicator variables consider computer selections as well when identifying the
existence of a run. In order to ensure the variables are mutually exclusive, each selection
can only be included in one of the variables.
Another measure of uncertainty is the number of selections by other teams
between the same team’s selections. This variable, henceforth referred to as picks until
the next pick, is defined as the number of picks until the next pick by the same team.
Since there are eight teams in each draft, the value for picks until the next picks repeats
the same sequence, going from 14 to one, decreasing by two each time until the value is
two, and then going to one before repeating the same cycle.
Looking at the summary statistics for participating and non-participating run
variables, it appears there are fewer runs of three than four or five. 9 This may indicate a
potential snow ball effect, where if owners see a position taken the previous few picks, he

9

Complete descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4 in the appendix.
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or she might feel the need to take the same position as well to avoid being stuck with an
inferior player.
At first glance it appears strange that there are an unequal number of selections in
the early, middle, and late round dummy variables. But, this is due to the increased
number of selections with a negative pick versus rank value in the later rounds. This is a
sign owners take more risks as the round increases. If the distribution of selections with
negative pick versus rank values was uniform across all 15 rounds, the average would be
eight. However, the fact the average round number is 8.43 is also an indication there are
more selections with a negative pick versus rank value in the later rounds.
5. Empirical Strategy and Results
In order to examine the determinants of risk tolerance, I estimate a probit model
of the following form:
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

(1)

where 𝑌𝑌 is an indicator variable, risk25, such that:

1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖∗ > 0
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = �
�
0 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ 0

(2)

and 𝑖𝑖 represents each individual draft pick. 𝑋𝑋 is a vector of observable characteristics

(number of humans in the draft, picks until the next pick by the same team, whether or
not the most recent picks are of the same position, and position indicator variables), and 𝜀𝜀

is an error term with the usual properties. The marginal probit effects and standard errors
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are presented for ease of interpretation with standard errors estimated using the delta
method.

Table 1
Determinants of Risk Tolerance
Variable

Dprobit

Number of Humans

0.001
(0.002)

Picks Until Next Pick

-0.001
(0.001)*

Same Position Selected Three Prior Picks

-0.008
(0.012)

Same Position Selected Four Prior Picks

-0.012
(0.021)

Same Position Selected Five Prior Picks

-0.038
(0.035)

Quarterback Dummy

-0.068
(0.014)**

Running Back Dummy

-0.114
(0.012)**

Wide Receiver Dummy

0.037
(0.012)**

Defense Dummy

-0.163
(0.015)**

Place Kicker Dummy

-0.329

(0.015)**
Notes: Probit and dprobit coefficient estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. Position dummies are
one if the player selected is listed as playing that position in FFC’s database. Significance at the 5% level is
noted with a single asterisk and significance at the 1% level is noted with two asterisks.

The results are presented in Table 1. It can be seen that the greater the difference
between picks from the same team, the lower the risk tolerance. Picks until the next user
pick is significant at the 5% level, which indicates that as the distance between picks
increases, owners exhibit more risk averse behavior. This could be due to the increased
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uncertainty with each additional selection before the same owner picks again. An owner
is less willing to take the chance a player he or she wants will be selected when there is a
large distance between his or her selections. For example, if an owner has the last
selection in the one round, they are presumably aware after they select first in the
following round, there are 14 selections before they pick again. When deciding which
player to select, the owner thinks about which players will still be available when they
select next. As a result, the owner must consider how the other seven owners will behave.
If they fear one of the other seven owners in the league has the same value for a player, it
is in their best interest to select the given player. Even if the player is ranked much lower
than where he was drafted. This is contrary to the findings of Treich (1997) and
Eeckhoudt (2000) that show risk averse owners place a lower value on information than
risk neutral owners. So perhaps the majority of owners are not risk averse to begin with
and thus still place a high value on more information.
The same position selected variables appear to not be significant in this model.
This could be due to a self-selection element where the choice to participate in the run is
an indication of a low risk tolerance, not the run itself. So another probit model will be
examined that has the exact same characteristics except for the non-participating run
variables have been replaced with participating run variables.
In the updated model all of the original coefficients show similar effects on risk
tolerance, but the participating run variables become significant with a larger marginal
effect the greater number of previous selections were the same position. 10 This appears to

10

See Table 5 in the Appendix for complete model output
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indicate the run itself does not suggest an owner will take part in a low risk strategy, but
rather the choice to participate in the run does. Partaking in the run is a sign that an owner
has a lower risk tolerance, not just the fact that a run occurred before hand. The
maximum impact on risk tolerance is observed when the five previous selections are of
the same position as the current pick and that occurrence decreases the probability of
inclusion in the top 75% of pick versus rank by 18.2 percentage points. This aligns with
intuition, since only those with low risk tolerances would worry that the position was
running out of players and choose to select a player who plays the same position. The
more risk neutral owners would recognize that if a run occurred before their pick there
might be value to be had with other positions.
Position also impacts if a selection falls within the lowest 25th percentile of pick
versus rank values. Both models suggest the riskiest positions, kicker and defense, appear
to indicate a low risk tolerance when selected relative to the left out category, tight end.
This could be due to the overwhelming number of defenses and kickers selected in the
later rounds. 11 It is difficult to interpret the coefficient in this context without considering
the effect of the skewed distribution on the model.
These models serve as a solid foundation to build upon, but there are some issues.
First, the models do not account for the heavily skewed distribution of defenses and
kickers in the final rounds of the draft. Another potential issue is this model shows the
number of humans is not a significant predictor of risk tolerance.

11

See appendix for breakdown of positions by round (Table 6)
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However, there is some significant difference between one human in a draft and
three and four humans when analyzing the number of humans in the draft as individual
binary variables. 12 In order to examine if there are any additional unobserved effects by
treating picks until the next pick as a linear variable, each category is separated and
analyzed. The high picks until the next pick values, 12 and 14, are statistically different
than one. 13 The owner who
As a result of these two findings, the next model replaces the linear number of
humans variable with a dummy variable that takes the value of one when there are only
one or two humans in the draft. The linear picks until the next pick variable is also
replaced with a binary variable that takes the value of one only when there are 12 or 14
selections before the same owner selects again.
The next model also considers the potential interactions between different
positions and the final five rounds in an attempt to control for the vast increase in kickers
and defenses/special teams selected in these final rounds. With all of the interaction terms
only taking the value of one when the selection is of the specified position and the round
number is 11 or greater. Indicator variables are still included for quarterback, running
back, and wide receiver to analyze the effect of position on risk in the first ten rounds in
comparison to tight end. Defense/special teams and kickers are not included as level
terms due to the limited number of them drafted through the first ten rounds. Since the
dependent variable is still risk25, a binary variable, it would be more appropriate to use a
probit model. However, due to the complex interaction terms, a standard linear regression
12
13

See appendix for complete model with coefficients (Table 7)
See appendix for complete model with coefficients (Table 8)
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is used to make interpreting the coefficients easier. 14 The updated model has the structure
of a typical OLS model:
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾(𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

(3)

The alterations to this new model include certain changes in the number of
observable characteristics included in the vector 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 . Namely a binary variable which
takes the value of one when only one or two humans are present to begin a draft and a

binary variable that takes the value of one when the round is 11 through 15. Beta is the
vector of coefficients with the non-interacted terms.
The added interaction term in the model is comprised of 𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 and the dummy

variable late round, which takes the value of one when the round is 11 or later and zero
otherwise. 𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 is a vector that contains every binary position variable except for the left
out group, tight end. With gamma being a vector of coefficients corresponding to the
interacted terms in the model.

14

Results are similar for a Dprobit model. Available upon request.
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Table 2
The Effect of the Interacting Positional Terms with Late Round Selections
Variable

Coefficients

Rounds 11 through 15

0.219
(0.025)**

Quarterback Selected in a Late Round Dummy

0.047
(0.032)

Running Back Selected in a Late Round Dummy

0.045
(0.029)

Wide Receiver Selected in a Late Round Dummy

-0.062
(0.029)*

Defense Selected in a Late Round Dummy

-0.235
(0.025)**

Kicker Selected in a Late Round Dummy

-0.424
(0.025)**

Quarterback Dummy

-0.011
(0.013)

Running Back Dummy

-0.041
(0.011)**

Wide Receiver Dummy

0.087
(0.012)**

Same Position Selected Three Prior Picks Plus Current Pick

-0.057
(0.020)**

Same Position Selected Four Prior Picks Plus Current Pick

-0.135
(0.038)**

Same Position Selected Five Prior Picks Plus Current Pick

-0.174
(0.058)**

One or Two Humans in the Draft

-0.018
(0.008)*

12 or 14 Picks Until the Next Pick by the Same Team

-0.016

(0.006)*
Notes: OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. Position dummies are one if the
player selected is listed as playing that position in FFC’s database. Significance at the 5% level is noted
with a single asterisk and significance at the 1% level is noted with two asterisks.

Table 2 presents the OLS results. Even though most of the coefficients are in line
with intuition, there are a few initial observations. First, a selection is more risk averse
when an owner selects a defense/special teams or a kicker in the later rounds as compared
to the middle and early rounds. Also, the participating run variables are all the same sign,
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and become more negative as the run increases in size. Furthermore, the high picks until
next pick variable, or the instance when there are 12 or 14 selections before an owner
appears to be significant as well. If there are a sizable number of selections by either
other human owners or computer owners, before an owner selects again, that owner is 1.5
percentage points less likely to make a risky selection. This supports the existence of a
snow ball effect where owners are nervous all of the high quality players at a given
position will be taken before they have another opportunity to pick.
One coefficient that is perhaps a bit counterintuitive is the coefficient
corresponding to one or two humans in the draft. Compared to when there are more than
two humans in a draft, an owner’s selection has a 1.8 percentage point lower chance to
make a selection indicative of a high risk tolerance. At first glance it would seem that the
more humans present in a draft, the more uncertainty since humans might have
unpredictable valuations. But perhaps the owners consider the inverse to be true. Owners
could potentially view computer drafters as more variable and difficult to anticipate. In
order to counter that suspicion, owners in drafts with only one or two humans might
diverge from their private valuations and select players before they normally would.
Moving onto analyzing the non-interacted positional terms, there are two
indicator variables that are significant, running back and wide receiver. Both coefficients
identify the effect of drafting a position as compared to tight end in the early or middle
rounds. The coefficient associated with selecting a running back over a tight end is 0.041, which means by selecting a running back an owner has decreased the chance of
that selection being classified as a risk neutral pick versus a risk averse by 4.1 percentage
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points. When an owner selects a running back over a tight end in the early and middle
rounds, this reduces the chance of a pick being classified as risk averse, since running
backs are less predictable and oft injured. Tight ends are the more stable and known
asset, so selecting one later in the draft does not have the same associated risk as
selecting a running back early in the draft. On the other hand, selecting a wide receiver
over a tight end reduces the probability of a selection having low risk tolerance by 8.7
percentage points. This is due to the relative scarcity at the tight end position. The most
common formation in today’s NFL involves three wide receivers with only one running
back and one tight end on the field. As teams are running more and more plays with three
wide receivers, the viable player pool for wide receiver increases and decreases for tight
end. This shift appears to be more powerful than the roster construction requirements of
two starting wide receivers versus one starting tight end as it indicates a wide receiver is a
riskier selection in the early and middle rounds of a draft.
Focusing now on the positional interaction terms, the three interaction terms that
are significant at the 5% level or greater are the wide receiver, defense/special teams, and
kicker interactions. Since position interaction terms are all compared to a tight end
selected in the late round, it can be understood that the interaction terms describe the
difference between the given position in the early and middle rounds versus the same
position in the late rounds.
The coefficients for the defense and kicker interactions terms are -.235 and -.424
respectively which indicate that as compared to defenses and kickers selected in the early
and middle rounds, either selected in the late rounds is 23.5 percentage points and 42.4
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percentage points more likely to have a risk25 value of zero, which indicates low risk
tolerance. So the defense/special teams and kicker interaction terms indicate there is a
distinct shift in how the round in the draft affects the risk of the selections. It is
distinctively less risky to select a kicker or a defense/special teams in the later rounds as
compared to the early and middle rounds, as they are much more variable and less
valuable. An owner who selects one before the final five rounds is diverging from the
typical strategy and displaying risk neutral behaviors.
The wide receiver interaction term also indicates that owners who select wide
receivers in the late rounds are exhibiting a risk averse behavior. This is a little strange as
running backs and wide receivers are typically the positions that are more commonly
selected in the early and middle rounds, thus selecting either position in the earlier rounds
would be in line with the prototypical strategy and thus indicate a lower risk tolerance.
But, if one considers the distribution of positions selected by round, it does not appear as
if owners are taking the same number of running backs and wide receivers, especially in
the early part of the draft. It appears as if the normal strategy is to then select running
backs early in the draft and wide receivers later. So the divergence from that strategy is
indicative of low risk tolerance and so when wide receivers are selected in the early and
middle rounds it is a greater indication of a low risk tolerance because they are selecting
more running backs in the earlier rounds.
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6. Conclusion
Fantasy football drafts exist in a unique realm, displaying characteristics differing
from auctions, lotteries, and financial investing. This paper examines how individuals
deal with risk given the set of circumstances where there are unknown elements, limited
resources, and dissimilar goods. These set of conditions can arise when individuals are
deciding whether to allocate more valuable resources to a good or service in the present
or wait in an attempt to allocate fewer resources to the same good or service at the risk of
another party acquiring it in the meantime.
This paper analyzes the elements of fantasy football drafts in order to
identify which factors contribute to the risk tolerance of a selection. Using mock draft
data acquired from Fantasy Football Calculator and ranking data from Fantasy Pros, the
risk tolerance associated with each individual selection was examined. It is shown that as
uncertainty, or ambiguity risk, increases, he or she is more likely to select a player before
his rank. The conclusion that risk averse individuals place additional value on
information as compared to risk neutral people, contradicts the findings of Treich (1997)
and Eeckhoudt (2000), that say risk averse individuals place less value on information.
Also, in accordance with McAfee and the declining price anomaly early on in the draft,
owners are more risk averse and stick to the rankings, but as the draft progresses there is
more variability.
Owners also tended to make more conservative selections when they decided to
participate in a run where they selected a player of the same position as the previous
three, four, or five picks. The risk aversion grew stronger as the number of previous
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selections that were the same position increased. The position of the player selected
tended to influence the probability of inclusion in the lowest 25th percentile of selections
as well. The more valuable a position was to the market, the lower risk it had associated
with it. Running back was deemed as the least risky selection, with defense/special teams
and kicker increasing the chance of a riskier selection by a substantial margin.
However, there are some limitations with the analysis of this paper. First of which
is the ranking set from Fantasy Pros that was used to determine which picks were
included in the lowest 25th percentile was designed for league sizes that are larger than
eight teams, so some of the kickers and defenses/special teams are ranked lower than they
should be given only 120 selections in the draft. Second, there is the issue of
approximating owners’ sets of personal valuations with a set of rankings. As opposed to
previous papers that look at risk tolerance in auctions which typically consider their
actual valuations to compare against where the player was drafted. Also, since the data is
acquired from mock drafts as opposed to actual drafts, owners may not have revealed
their true risk tolerance with each selection since there is nothing on the line.
One potential area for future research regarding risk tolerance in fantasy football
drafts is looking at drafts involving more than eight teams. By looking at ten or twelve
team leagues, more relationships might be found between the distance between selections
by the same owner and the number of humans in the draft. Also, as the league size
increases, certain positions may be valued differently, as more teams are attempting to
acquire starting caliber players.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1
Scatterplot of Pick Versus Rank Values

Frequency of Pick Versus Rank Values
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Figure 2

Pick Versus Rank Quartiles for Rounds One through Fifteen. The more negative the value, the larger the
selection deviated from the ranking.
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Table 3
Breakdown of all Selections by Round by Humans
Round
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Sum
Avg. Per Team

QB

RB

WR

TE

22
40
385
316
222
240
299
589
432
386
666
598
469
146
281
5091
1.729867

1719
1528
1146
1422
1041
909
1092
969
1049
933
812
760
615
207
384
14586
4.956167

1200
1293
1098
1154
1426
1425
970
968
1121
1309
983
776
747
201
563
15234
5.176351

1
80
310
49
251
363
578
404
284
205
238
238
232
115
182
3530
1.199456

DEF
1
1
1
0
2
3
2
9
43
81
210
480
663
1194
256
2946
1.001019

PK
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
2
13
26
33
89
214
1076
1271
2727
0.926606

Distributions of positions selected by round from the 44,112 observations that are human selected players.
With the average obtained by dividing each total by 2943, the number of complete teams drafted by
humans.
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Table 4
Selected Descriptive Statistics for Relevant Variables

Variable
Round Number

8.430

Late Round Number

(0.481)

(4.370)
Number of Humans

4.317

Low Picks Until Next Pick

63.894

Middle Picks Until Next Pick

90.526

High Picks Until Next Pick

26.6317

Wide Receiver Dummy

7.160

Running Back Dummy

0.002

Quarterback Dummy

0.006

Tight End Dummy

0.019

Defense Dummy

0.058

Place Kicker Dummy

0.731

Quarterback Dummy * Late Round Number

0.140

Running Back Dummy * Late Round Number

0.740

Tight End Dummy * Late Round Number

0.119

Wide Receiver Dummy * Late Round Number

0.300

Defense Dummy * Late Round Number

0.335
(0.472)

0.120
(0.324)

(0.458)
Middle Round Number

0.050
(0.217)

(0.324)
Early Round Number

0.014
(0.118)

(0.438)
High Number of Humans in Draft

0.044
(0.204)

(0.347)
Middle Number of Humans in Draft

0.023
(0.150)

(0.443)
Low Number of Humans in Draft

0.116
(0.320)

(0.233)
Lowest 25th Percentile Pick Versus Rank

0.126
(0.331)

(0.135)
Three or of Four the Same Position

0.096
(0.295)

(0.075)
Five of the Same Position

0.130
(0.336)

(0.048)
Four of the Same Position

0.332
(0.471)

(4.442)
Three of the Same Position

0.200
(0.400)

(31.606)
Picks Until Next Pick

0.259
(0.438)

(60.443)
Pick Versus Rank

0.367
(0.482)

(34.997)
Rank

0.375
(0.484)

(1.691)
Pick Number

0.365

Place Kicker Dummy * Late Round Number

0.114
(0.318)

Summary Statistics for all relevant variables. Mean with standard errors in parenthesis underneath.
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Table 5
Regression Coefficient Significance for Risk25 with Participating Run Variables
Variable
Number of Humans
Picks Until Next Pick
Same Position Selected Three Prior Picks Plus Current Pick
Same Position Selected Four Prior Picks Plus Current Pick
Same Position Selected Five Prior Picks Plus Current Pick
Quarterback Dummy
Running Back Dummy
Wide Receiver Dummy
Defense Dummy
Place Kicker Dummy
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Dprobit
0.001
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.001)*
-0.074
(0.023)**
-0.159
(0.044)**
-0.183
(0.071)**
-0.068
(0.014)**
-0.110
(0.012)**
0.043
(0.012)**
-0.161
(0.015)**
-0.325
(0.015)**

Table 6
Positional Distribution by Round of Human Selections with a Negative Pick Versus Rank
Round
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Sum

QB

RB

WR

TE

DEF

PK

22
40
385
316
215
173
287
431
371
274
169
191
133
25
20
3052

692
827
722
859
641
613
735
490
615
562
287
215
240
116
167
7781

410
369
151
359
542
635
389
332
225
105
285
316
273
110
182
4683

1
80
287
40
71
239
424
358
251
176
144
79
53
24
34
2261

1
1
1
0
2
3
2
9
43
81
210
480
663
1194
256
2946

0
0
1
0
0
1
1
2
13
26
33
89
214
1076
1269
2725

Distribution and total number drafted of positions selected by round from the 23,448 observations that are
human selected players with a pick before their ranking.
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Table 7
Probit Regression Coefficient Significance for Risk25 Against Number of Human Dummies
Variable
2 Humans in the Draft

Probit
0.059
(0.052)
0.084
(0.049)
0.103
(0.048)*
0.060
(0.049)
0.030
(0.052)
0.073
(0.055)
0.052
(0.062)

3 Humans in the Draft
4 Humans in the Draft
5 Humans in the Draft
6 Humans in the Draft
7 Humans in the Draft
8 Humans in the Draft

Probit model with risk25 as the dependent variable and individual number of humans as independent
variables. Coefficient estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. One human in the draft is the left out
group. Statistical significance is denoted by one asterisk (p < 0.05).

36

Table 8
Probit Regression Coefficient Significance for Risk25 Against Picks Until Next Selection by the
Same Owner
Variable
2 Selections before Same Owner Picks
4 Selections before Same Owner Picks
6 Selections before Same Owner Picks
8 Selections before Same Owner Picks
10 Selections before Same Owner Picks
12 Selections before Same Owner Picks
14 Selections before Same Owner Picks

Probit
-0.058
(0.035)
-0.018
(0.035)
0.020
(0.035)
0.020
(0.035)
-0.062
(0.035)
-0.084
(0.035)**
-0.052
(0.025)

Probit model with risk25 as the dependent variable Picks Until Next Selection by the Same Owner, pup, as
independent variables. Coefficient estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. One pick before the same
owner selects, in other words the same owner has multiple picks in a row, is the left out group. Statistical
significance is denoted by one asterisk (p < 0.05).
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Table 9
Breakdown of all Selections by Round
Round
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

RB

WR

QB

TE

DEF

PK

3860
3644
2756
3290
3285
2039
2292
1901
3025
3921
1718
1963
1531
213
744

2989
3047
2626
2735
2499
3339
1959
1508
2347
2109
2975
2065
2118
201
1211

23
54
771
772
573
935
871
2055
820
477
1561
1423
1196
148
689

1
126
716
74
513
554
1747
1396
624
255
243
264
351
118
277

1
1
1
0
2
3
2
9
43
82
342
1065
1457
3463
404

1
0
1
0
0
1
1
2
13
26
33
91
217
2726
3540

Distribution of all human and computer selections by round.
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